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Abstract
The CDC recommends that healthcare settings provide influenza patients with facemasks as a means of reducing
transmission to staff and other patients, and a recent report suggested that surgical masks can capture influenza virus in
large droplet spray. However, there is minimal data on influenza virus aerosol shedding, the infectiousness of exhaled
aerosols, and none on the impact of facemasks on viral aerosol shedding from patients with seasonal influenza. We
collected samples of exhaled particles (one with and one without a facemask) in two size fractions (‘‘coarse’’.5 mm,
‘‘fine’’#5 mm) from 37 volunteers within 5 days of seasonal influenza onset, measured viral copy number using quantitative
RT-PCR, and tested the fine-particle fraction for culturable virus. Fine particles contained 8.8 (95% CI 4.1 to 19) fold more
viral copies than did coarse particles. Surgical masks reduced viral copy numbers in the fine fraction by 2.8 fold (95% CI 1.5
to 5.2) and in the coarse fraction by 25 fold (95% CI 3.5 to 180). Overall, masks produced a 3.4 fold (95% CI 1.8 to 6.3)
reduction in viral aerosol shedding. Correlations between nasopharyngeal swab and the aerosol fraction copy numbers
were weak (r=0.17, coarse; r=0.29, fine fraction). Copy numbers in exhaled breath declined rapidly with day after onset of
illness. Two subjects with the highest copy numbers gave culture positive fine particle samples. Surgical masks worn by
patients reduce aerosols shedding of virus. The abundance of viral copies in fine particle aerosols and evidence for their
infectiousness suggests an important role in seasonal influenza transmission. Monitoring exhaled virus aerosols will be
important for validation of experimental transmission studies in humans.
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Introduction
Transmission of influenza virus between humans may occur by
three routes: (1) direct or indirect contact between an infected and
a susceptible person, usually resulting in contamination of a
susceptible person’s hands followed by hand to respiratory mucosa
contact; (2) large droplet spray wherein droplets of respiratory fluid
greater than approximately 100 mm in diameter are expelled with
sufficient momentum to deliver a direct hit on the respiratory
mucosa; and (3) aerosols generated by release of smaller, virus-
containing droplets, as may occur during tidal breathing and
coughing [1,2], that rapidly evaporate into residual particles
(droplet nuclei),which are inhaled and deposited in the respiratory
tract [3–6]. There is significant evidence for each of these routes
[7,8], but their relative importance is not known [3]. As a result,
the Institute of Medicine recommended that healthcare workers in
contact with 2009-H1N1 patients use protection against all of the
possible routes of infection, including use of fit-tested N95
respirators [3]. A year after the 2009 pandemic, there was no
greater clarity on the importance of the various modes of
transmission [9].
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently
funded an experimental study of person-to-person transmission to
address this important knowledge gap [10]. However, an
experimental study using intranasal inoculation to infect experi-
mental donors [11] will need to show that the donors and naturally
infected persons shed similar virus aerosols with regard to
quantity, particle size distribution, and infectiousness, given that
earlier experiments suggested that intranasal inoculation requires
quantitatively larger doses and produces qualitatively milder illness
than does inoculation via aerosol [12].
In an occupational hygiene context, personal protection is
usually the last resort, after source mitigation and environmental
controls are exhausted [13]. Thus, it is worthwhile considering
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control. The CDC recommends that persons with influenza wear
surgical masks when in contact with susceptible individuals
[14,15]. However, there is only one report studying mask impact
on containment of infectious large droplet spray during influenza
infection [16], and no data on surgical mask impact on release of
infectious viral aerosols.
In the current study of patients infected with seasonal influenza,
we describe the number of copies of viral RNA in two aerosol size
fractions, report the culturability of virus in the fine-particle
fraction, and the effect of surgical masks.
Results
We screened 89 volunteers: 33 (37%) tested positive for
influenza using the rapid test (20 influenza A and 13 influenza
B) and were asked to provide exhaled breath samples. Eight
additional volunteers with negative rapid tests who reported a
cough and who had a temperature of $37.8uC were also invited to
participate. In total, 38 volunteers were confirmed to have
influenza virus infection by PCR of nasopharyngeal specimens.
Exhaled breath data with and without a surgical mask are
complete for 37 of the 38 volunteers (21 influenza A, 16 influenza
B); data for one volunteer has been excluded due to laboratory
error in sample processing. One of the infected subjects reported
receiving influenza vaccine for the current year. None of the
subjects sneezed during the sample collection. Table 1 shows the
sex, symptom and fever prevalence, and influenza virus type and
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for age and viral RNA copy
number in swabs and exhaled aerosol fractions of the 37
volunteers with confirmed influenza infection. The viral copy
numbers in each of the five specimens for all 37 cases are shown in
Table S1.
We detected influenza virus RNA in the coarse fraction
(particles greater than 5 mm) collected from 11% (4 of 37
volunteers) while wearing surgical masks and from 43% (16 of
37) while not wearing a mask (relative risk for virus detection with
mask=0.25, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.09 to 0.67; McNe-
mar’s test p=0.003). The median number of coarse fraction viral
copies (Figure 1) was below the limit of detection with and without
facemasks; the 75
th percentile dropped from 37 to below the limit
of detection with use of surgical masks. Using Tobit analysis, we
estimated that the geometric mean coarse fraction copy number
without a facemask was 12 (95% confidence interval (CI), 4 to 37)
and that the effect of facemasks was to produce a statistically
significant 25 fold reduction in the copy number (95% CI 3.5 to
180, p=0.002) to ,0.5 copies per 30 min sample.
We detected viral RNA in 78% (29 of 37) of fine particle
samples collected from volunteers when they were wearing a mask
and in 92% (34 of 37) of samples collected when they were not
wearing a mask. Thus, the relative risk for any virus detection with
mask versus without a mask was 0.85 and borderline statistically
significant (CI 0.72 to 1.01; McNemar’s test p=0.06). However,
the reduction in copy number was statistically significant: The
median number of viral copies in the fine particle fraction was 250
with masks and 560 without masks. The geometric mean copy
number in the fine particle fraction without a facemask was 110
(95% CI 45 to 260) and the facemasks produced a 2.8 fold
reduction in copy number (95% CI 1.5 to 5.2, p=0.001).
Combining the coarse and fine fractions, we detected viral RNA
in 29 (78%) subjects when wearing facemasks and 35 (95%) when
not wearing facemasks (McNemar’s test p=0.01). Surgical masks
produced a 3.4 (95% CI 1.8 to 6.3) fold reduction in viral copies in
exhaled breath.
Fine fraction copy numbers were on average 8.8 (95% CI 4.1 to
19) times larger than coarse fraction copy numbers. The coarse
and fine fraction copy numbers were correlated (r=0.60,
p,0.0001). The viral load in the nasopharyngeal swab specimen,
however, was not correlated with that in the coarse fraction
(r=0.17, p=0.31) and only weakly with that in the fine fraction
(r=0.29, p=0.08). There was no significant difference in copy
number between influenza A and B virus infection in either the
coarse (p=0.28) or fine (p=0.26) fraction. Reported asthma
(p=0.029) and feverishness (p=0.014) were associated with
significantly lower fine fraction copy numbers. However, coarse
fraction copy numbers were not significantly impacted and
temperature measured at the time of testing was not associated
with exhaled copy numbers. Vaccination in any prior year was
Table 1. Participant’s sex, symptoms, temperature, and
influenza virus type.
N Percent
Number with complete data 37 100
Male 30 81
On antiviral medicine
a 00
Asthmatic
a 51 4
Flu shot this season
a 13
Flu shot previous seasons
a 12 32
Current smoker
a 92 4
Tachypnea
a 13 35
Breathing difficulty
a 16 43
Lymphadenopathy
a 18 49
Feverish
a 19 51
Temperature
b $37.8uC1 0 2 7
Type A 21 57
aSelf-reported.
bAt time of exhaled breath measurement.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205.t001
Author Summary
The relative importance of direct and indirect contact,
large droplet spray, and aerosols as modes of influenza
transmission is not known but is important in devising
effective interventions. Surgical facemasks worn by pa-
tients are recommended by the CDC as a means of
reducing the spread of influenza in healthcare facilities. We
sought to determine the total number of viral RNA copies
present in exhaled breath and cough aerosols, whether the
RNA copies in fine particle aerosols represent infectious
virus, and whether surgical facemasks reduce the amount
of virus shed into aerosols by people infected with
seasonal influenza viruses. We found that total viral copies
detected by molecular methods were 8.8 times more
numerous in fine (#5 mm) than in coarse (.5 mm) aerosol
particles and that the fine particles from cases with the
highest total number of viral RNA copies contained
infectious virus. Surgical masks reduced the overall
number of RNA copies by 3.4 fold. These results suggest
an important role for aerosols in transmission of influenza
virus and that surgical facemasks worn by infected persons
are potentially an effective means of limiting the spread of
influenza.
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in coarse (p=0.11) and fine fractions (p=0.15); there were too few
having received the current season’s vaccine to analyze. Self-
reported tachypnea, breathing difficulty, smoking, and lymphade-
nopathy were not associated with significant shifts in exhaled copy
numbers.
We recovered infectious virus from fine particle samples (with
and without mask) produced by the two subjects with the highest
numbers of viral RNA copies in the fine particle fraction after
blind passage on MDCK cells. Sequence analysis showed that the
two isolates were seasonal H1N1, with sequence differences from
each other and unrelated to any viruses present in the Veterinary
Medicine laboratories at the time these samples were cultured.
Virus copy number (Table 3) declined with time since onset of
symptoms. In the coarse fraction, each additional day after onset
was associated with a 6.0 fold drop in the number of virus copies
detected (95% CI 1.7 to 21 fold). Fine particles also declined with
time, each additional day after onset was associated with a 2.4 fold
drop in the number of copies detected (95% CI 1.1 to 5.1 fold).
Discussion
We measured exhaled influenza viral particle copy number by
quantitative RT- PCR in two particle size fractions, $5 mm
(coarse) and ,5 mm (fine), and assayed the fine fraction for
culturable virus. We observed that viral copy numbers were
greater in the fine than in the coarse fraction, and recovered
infectious virus from the fine particle fraction collected from the
two samples with the highest RNA copy numbers. These results,
combined with older data suggesting that the infectious dose via
aerosol is about two orders of magnitude lower than via large
droplets [12], suggest an important role for aerosols in seasonal
influenza transmission.
Surgical masks nearly eliminated viral RNA detection in the
coarse aerosol fraction with a 25 fold reduction in the number of
viral copies, a statistically significant 2.8 fold reduction in copies
detected in the fine aerosol fraction, and an overall statistically
significant 3.4 fold reduction of viral copy number in the exhaled
aerosols. This finding supports current Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention recommendations that healthcare facilities en-
courage patients with influenza-like illness to don surgical
facemasks as one component of an influenza infection control
program [17].
When volunteers were not wearing surgical masks, we detected
virus RNA in coarse particles exhaled by 43% and in fine particles
exhaled by 92% of influenza patients. This is in contrast to the
report by Johnson et al [16], who detected influenza virus RNA in
cough generated large droplet spray from 100% of influenza
patients over two brief sampling trials, and from 78% on each trial.
These discrepant findings are likely due to the very different
collection techniques and particle sizes collected in these two
studies. We used a specially designed aerosol sampler to collect
particles from 0.05 to 50 mm in diameter. Johnson et al, by
contrast, used simple deposition on petri dishes, and based on
particle settling rates and collection times, that method would have
been unlikely to collect particles with diameters of less than
approximately 50 mm because smaller particles would have
remained suspended in air and flowed around the petri dishes.
We view results from Johnson et al and the present study as
complementary. Together the studies show that surgical masks
can limit the emission of large droplet spray and aerosol droplets
larger than 5 mm [16]. However, surgical masks are not as
efficient at preventing release of very small particles. It is well
known that surgical masks are not effective for preventing
exposure to fine particles when worn as personal protection [18].
We had hypothesized that when used as source control, exhaled
droplets might be large enough prior to evaporation to be
effectively captured, primarily through impaction. This appears
to be true for virus carried in coarse particles. But the majority of
virus in the exhaled aerosol appear to be in the fine fraction that
is not well contained. Nevertheless, the overall 3.4 fold reduction
in aerosol copy numbers we observed combined with a nearly
complete elimination of large droplet spray demonstrated by
Johnson et al. suggests that surgical masks worn by infected
persons could have a clinically significant impact on transmission.
For example if one hypothesized that all transmission were due to
aerosol particles ,50 mm, and estimated a reproductive number
of 1.5 for influenza (i.e. each infection generates 1.5 new
infections on average at the start of the epidemic) [19], then the
use of surgical masks by every infected case could reduce the
reproductive number below 1 [20]. Compliance, however, would
be a major limitation resulting in lower efficacy in real-world
practice [21,22].
While it is generally assumed that large droplets shed from the
respiratory tract contain infectious virus, there are limited data
that indicate that fine particle aerosols released from the human
respiratory tract contain infectious virus. In one previous study by
Lindsley et al, infectious virus was detected in 2 of 21 cough
aerosol samples, once with a sampler that did not discriminate
between coarse and fine particles and once in the coarse particle
fraction of a second instrument [23]. This observation, along with
our observation that it was possible to recover culturable virus
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Percentiles
Min 25
th Median 75
th Max
Age 18 18 19 20 54
Days since onset
a 01235
Nasopharyngeal swab copy number 1.7610
3 8.3610
4 4.2610
5 1.8610
6 3.4610
7
Coarse particle copy number with mask 0 0 0 0 7.7610
1
Coarse particle copy number no mask 0 0 0 3.7610
1 2.9610
4
Fine particle copy number with mask 0 5 2.2610
1 2.5610
2 2.4610
4
Fine particle copy number no mask 0 1.1610
1 1.1610
2 5.6610
2 1.3610
5
aAt time of exhaled breath measurement.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205.t002
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humans generate infectious influenza aerosols in both coarse and
fine particle fractions. This lends support to the hypothesis that
aerosols may be a common pathway for influenza transmission
among humans [8,24]. However, a clear test of the hypothesis
requires intervention studies that can interrupt only one mode of
transmission without interfering with others [25].
We only detected infectious virus in exhaled breath samples
with high (10
4 to 10
5) copy numbers by quantitative RT-PCR.
This implies that the ratio of total viral particles to infectious virus
was about 10
3 to 10
4, compared with 10
2 to 10
3 for laboratory
stocks and experimental aerosols [26]. It is not yet known whether
the low recovery of infectious virus (despite high copy numbers of
viral RNA) represents technical difficulties in sampling and
culturing exhaled breath samples or whether the vast majority of
the virus exhaled by influenza A patients is actually non-infectious.
These findings are consistent with those by Lindsley et al. [23] We
designed the sampler specifically to overcome problems with
existing bioaerosol samplers, including efficiently collecting sub-
micron particles into a liquid and use of appropriate buffer to
preserve infectiousness [27]. We have previously shown that
collection on solid, dry collection media resulted in large losses of
culturability [26]. Therefore, we did not attempt to culture the
coarse fraction collected on a Teflon substrate. Subsequent studies
in our laboratory indicated that about 50% of the infectious virus
is lost during the concentration step of our procedure (data not
Figure 1. Influenza virus copy number in aerosol particles exhaled by patients with and without wearing of an ear-loop surgical
mask. Counts below the limit of detection are represented as 0.5 on the log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205.g001
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rate of recovery of infectious virus in this study.
The lack of strong correlation between the viral load in the
nasopharyngeal and aerosol samples is possibly of interest. This
may merely be a result of nasopharyngeal sample variability; in
future studies, control for sample quality by PCR of a cellular gene
may be helpful. Our sampler, as is the case with all samplers for
fine and ultrafine particles, has an upper limit to the size droplet
that can be pulled into its inlet airstream. Thus, a second possible
explanation for the lack of correlation is that the nasopharynx is
primarily a source for very large droplets (.50 mm) that we would
not have detected. Furthermore, none of our subjects sneezed; an
efficient method of generating droplets from the upper respiratory
tract. This may imply that the smaller droplets we detected were
generated in the lower respiratory tract and that the viral load at
that location is not strongly correlated with the nasopharyngeal
load. Alternatively, shedding into aerosol droplets may be driven
by other host factors (e.g. asthma, symptom severity, and immune
response), co-infection with other agents, virus factors affecting
release from the epithelium, or the nature of the resident
microbiome. If shedding into aerosol is determined in large part
by the location of infection in the respiratory tract, this may have
implications for experimental studies of transmission [11,28]. Such
studies will need to monitor aerosol shedding to determine
whether nasal inoculation of donors results in aerosol shedding
that mimics naturally acquired infection to validate the experi-
mental design and aid the interpretation of results.
Most of the viral aerosol generation we observed occurred
during the first days of symptomatic illness (Table 3), consistent
with studies of shedding monitored by nasal washes [29]. We
studied each individual on only one occasion and, by design, have
little data beyond day 3. Further longitudinal studies of viral
aerosol generation are needed to confirm these findings. New
study designs will be needed to examine aerosol generation before
and on the day of symptom onset in community acquired
infection. A limitation of our study is that we recruited patients
with certain signs and symptoms or who were positive on a rapid
test or had fever, and therefore our data could be biased towards
patients with higher viral loads [21]. However, we still observed
significant inter-individual variation and modeling suggests that
cases with higher viral loads are disproportionately important in
the spread of influenza [30,31]. Additional studies are also needed
to determine how aerosol generation correlates with symptoms
(including milder disease), presence of other health conditions, age
(we studied a narrow age distribution), and co-infection with other
respiratory viruses so that recommendations for infection control
can be critically evaluated.
Methods
Patient population
Werecruited volunteers with influenza-like illness from the Lowell,
MA community, primarily among students and staff of the University
of Massachusetts, beginning January 29 and ending March 12, 2009.
The study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards
of the University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell General Hospital,
and Saints Memorial Hospital, Lowell, MA. Oral informed consent
was obtained by providing each subject with a detailed consent
information form. Collection of a signed copy of the form was waived
because it would have been the only personally identifiable
information retained by this minimal risk study.
Volunteers learned of the study through flyers and notices
posted on campus and by referral from health care providers. We
screened self-referred volunteers by telephone for influenza-like
illness (ILI). Persons who reported onset of fever and cough within
the preceding 72 hours or were referred by a health care provider
were invited to the laboratory for testing. We collected a
nasopharyngeal specimen using a flocked swab (501CS01, Copan
Diagnostics, Murrieta, CA) and temperature was taken with a
digital ear thermometer (Model 18-200-000, Mabis Healthcare,
Waukegan, IL). All volunteers with a temperature $37.8uC and a
cough and volunteers without fever who provided a nasopharyn-
geal specimen positive for influenza by point of care testing
(QuikVue Influenza A/B, Quidel Corp., San Diego, CA) were
invited to provide exhaled breath samples, answer a questionnaire,
and provide a second nasopharyngeal specimen for analysis by
PCR. Only subjects with influenza infection confirmed by PCR
were included in the data analysis.
Table 3. Copy number coarse and fine exhaled particles without surgical mask by day since onset of influenza symptoms.
Number of Virus Particles
Days Since Onset
a Particle Size Number of Cases Min Median Maximum
1S w a b 1 0 2 . 1 610
4 1.1610
6 3.4610
7
Coarse ,LD 2.3610
1 2.9610
4
Fine 4 6.1610
2 1.3610
5
2S w a b 1 5 1 . 7 610
4 1.0610
5 3.4610
6
Coarse ,LD ,LD 4.7610
2
Fine ,LD 2.1610
1 3.9610
4
3 Swab 7 2.3610
4 1.4610
6 1.0610
7
Coarse ,LD ,LD 1.1610
2
Fine 2 3.7610
1 5.3610
2
4 Swab 3 8.1610
4 4.2610
5 1.5610
6
Coarse ,LD ,LD ,LD
Fine 3.2610
1 7.5610
1 4.4610
2
aBecause there were only single cases studied on day 0 (day of onset) and on day 5 since onset of symptoms, only data for cases studied on days 1 through 4 after onset
of symptoms are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205.t003
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We collected exhaled breath with the subject seated in front of
the inlet for a sampler designed for human exhaled breath
collection, Figure 2, (G-II) described in detail by McDevitt et al.
[27] Briefly, the G-II inlet was cone shaped so that the subject’s
face was situated inside the large end of an open cone with air
drawn continuously around the subject and into the sampler. The
cone allows the subject to breathe normally and unlike use of a
mouthpiece, the subject could also wear a mask. The cone served
as a capture type ventilation hood allowing collection of exhaled
breath with minimal fugitive emissions even when the subject was
wearing a mask with resultant redirection of flow. Intake air
(130 L/min) flowed through a conventional slit impactor that
collected particles larger than 5 mm on a Teflon surface (‘‘coarse’’
particle fraction). To collect a ‘‘fine’’ particle fraction, water
vapor was condensed on the remaining particles, which created
droplets large enough to be captured by a 1.0-mms l i ti m p a c t o r .
The 1.0-mm impactor was composed of a slit and a steel
impaction surface sealed inside a large reservoir. Impacted
droplets drained from the impaction surface into a buffer-
containing liquid in the bottom of the reservoir. Concentrated
buffer was pumped into the reservoir during collection to match
the accumulation of water from collected droplets and maintain
phosphate buffered saline with 0.1% bovine serum albumin
throughout collection. The sampler was shown to be 85%
efficient for particles greater than 50 nm in diameter and was
comparable to the SKC BioSampler for detection and recovery of
influenza A/PR/8/34 H1N1 by PCR and culture. Between
subjects, the apparatus was disassembled and cleaned with a
0.5% hypochlorite solution.
Exhaled particles were collected for 30 minutes while the
subject wore an ear-loop surgical mask (Kimberly-Clark, Roswell,
GA) and then for 30 minutes without a mask. Subjects were asked
to cough 10 times at approximately 10-minute intervals for a total
of 30 coughs during each 30 minute sample. One subject coughed
frequently such that forced coughs were not required. No subjects
were observed to sneeze.
Sample analysis
Immediately after collection, the Teflon impaction surface was
removed and temporarily stored at 220uC. The impactors were
scraped with a flocked swab wetted with Dulbecco’s phosphate
buffered saline with calcium and magnesium (Hyclone, Thermo
Scientific, Waltham, MA) with 0.1% bovine serum albumin
(DPBS++BSA). The swab was eluted in 600 ml of DPBS++BSA for
1 minute with vortexing. The resulting sample was stored at
280uC.
The fine particle fraction collected in DPBS++BSA buffer (100
to 150 ml volume) was maintained at 4uC and concentrated by
ultrafiltration using Amicon Ultra 15 filter units with a molecular
weight cut off of 100 kD (Millipore, Bedford, MA) to a volume of
approximately 400 ml. Following ultrafiltration, the filter was
washed with 200 ml of DPBS++BSA, and the wash solution was
combined with the retentate. Samples were stored at 280uC.
RNA extraction in Trizol-chloroform, reverse transcription, and
quantitative PCR were performed as previously described [1,32].
Quantitative PCR was performed using an Applied Biosystems
Prism 7300 detection system (Foster City, CA) for coarse fraction
samples or a LightCycler 480 (Roche, Indianapolis, IN) for the fine
particle fraction. Duplicate samples were analyzed using influenza
A and B primers described by van Elden et al. [33] A standard
curve was constructed in each assay with cDNA extracted from a
stock of influenza A (A/Puerto Rico/8/1934, Advanced Biotech-
nologies Incorporated, Columbia, MD) with a concentration of
3.0610
11 virus particles per mL or a stock of influenza B (B/Lee/
1940, Advanced Biotechnologies Incorporated, Columbia, MD)
with a concentration of 8.6610
10 virus particles per mL as
determined by electron microscopy. Results are expressed as the
total number of virus particles by reference to the standard curve,
rounded to the closest integer value. The limits of detection were 6
and 11 viral RNA copies per qPCR well for influenza A and B
respectively. Fine particle samples from all subjects were cultured
for infectious virus on MDCK cells. Confluent cells in 24-well
plates (Corning, NY, USA)were inoculated with 0.1 ml of the
concentrated sample diluted 1:1 in OptiMEMH I medium
(Invitrogen, Carlsbad, California). The plates were incubated at
37uC for 1 h with rocking every 15 min, and 0.8 ml of
OptiMEMH I media with 1 mg/ml of TPCK-trypsin was added
to each well and incubated for 72–96 h. The cells were checked
daily for cytopathic effect (CPE) and if none was detected, two
blind passages were performed using cell supernatant. At each
passage, supernatants were tested for influenza virus by hemag-
glutination (HA) assay using 0.5% chicken red blood cells. Positive
samples were confirmed by Flu DETECT (Synbiotics, CA, USA)
Figure 2. Exhaled breath collection system. Each volunteer sat as
shown with face inside the inlet cone of the human exhaled breath air
sampler inside a booth supplied with HEPA filtered, humidified air for
30 min while wearing an ear-loop surgical mask. Three times during the
30 min each subject was asked to cough 10 times. After investigators
changed the collection media, the volunteer sat in the cone again,
without wearing a surgical mask, for another 30 min with coughing as
before.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205.g002
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by RT-PCR followed by sequencing.
Statistical analysis
We analyzed the effect of surgical masks as a) log relative risk for
production of any virus aerosols assuming a binomial distribution
using generalized estimating equations with exchangeable within-
subject correlation to account for repeated measures, and b) the
geometric mean counts of virus particles detected in exhaled
breath by qPCR and fractional reduction in copy number using
Tobit regression analysis on log copy number with a random effect
to account for variability between individuals. Tobit analysis was
also used to compare coarse and fine particle fractions. Tobit
regression avoids bias that would arise from assigning samples
below the limit of detection a specific value such as zero or the
limit divided by the square root of 2. Surgical mask use was the
dependent variable. We also computed McNemar’s test for paired
samples to examine mask effect and Spearman’s correlation
coefficient to examine the relationship between the load in the
nasopharyngeal swab and aerosol fractions. Statistical analyses
were performed using SAS (Procs GenMod, NLMixed, Lifereg,
Freq, Corr, and Means, version 9.2, Cary, NC).
Supporting Information
Table S1 Copy number and influenza type in five assayed
samples per subject.
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